TamingDNS MCP
A remote MCP server providing DNS and email authentication diagnostic tools for AI agents. It allows querying SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, and DNSSEC records, as well as analyzing email headers and bounce codes. The server operates without authentication and returns structured JSON results identical to the web interface.
Endpoint and access
No sign-in to connect and list tools. Individual tools may still need a vendor account, credentials, or permissions; check the documented prerequisites.
https://tamingdns.com/mcpWhat its tools do
10 tools, grouped by the hints the server advertises. Hints are self-declared, not verified behavior.
Checks and signals
Each line is separate evidence, not a trust score.
- Passed Endpoint answered the live check ·
- Passed Official MCP Registry namespace is tied to tamingdns.com ·
- Passed Endpoint is on the registry namespace domain ·
- Warning Advertises resources/templates/list but does not implement it
- Availability 1 of 1 checks passed in 30 days
What you can do with it
- Check SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records for a domain
- Analyze raw email headers for authentication results
- Validate DNSSEC chain of trust and DANE TLSA records
- Decode SMTP bounce messages and NDRs
Source and maintenance
Protocol and capabilities
- Server
- tamingdns 1.0.0
- MCP protocol negotiated in check
- 2025-11-25
- Tools
- 10 advertised
- Resources
- 1 advertised
- Resource templates
- Not advertised
- Prompts
- 1 advertised
{
"tools": {},
"prompts": {},
"resources": {}
}Tools
10 advertised
check_spf — SPF Record Checker
Check the SPF record for a domain. Returns the raw record, grade (A-F), the terminal `all` qualifier (resolved through redirect= chains), structured findings (NEAR_LOOKUP_LIMIT, LOOKUP_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, PLUS_ALL_DANGEROUS, PTR_MECHANISM_DEPRECATED, etc.), and an `analysis` block with the expanded include/redirect tree and the RFC 7208 §4.6.4 lookup count. Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "SPF Record Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_dkim — DKIM Checker
Look up a DKIM public key at <selector>._domainkey.<domain> and validate it. Detects key revocation (empty p=), RSA key length (KEY_TOO_SHORT below 1024, KEY_WEAK below 2048), SHA-1 hash deprecation, and t=y test mode. For selector1/selector2 it also checks a Microsoft 365 CNAME target carries the token Microsoft builds for the domain (M365_DKIM_CNAME_MISMATCH), even when no key resolves. Returns an `analysis` block with the per-key facts (key_type, key_bits, key_strength, revoked, test_mode, hash_algs, m365_cname). Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain",
"selector"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
},
"selector": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{1,63}$",
"maxLength": 63,
"description": "DKIM selector, e.g. \"google\", \"selector1\", \"20230601\"."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "DKIM Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_dmarc — DMARC Record Analyser
Check the _dmarc record for a domain with DUAL discovery: the RFC 7489 §6.6.3 organisational-domain ladder (what major receivers enforce today — grade/verdict anchor to it) AND the RFC 9989 §4.10 DNS Tree Walk (8-query cap, psd=n/y stop rules, fewest-labels org selection) into analysis.discovery {legacy, tree_walk, diverges}. When the two methods select different policy records or org domains, DISCOVERY_DIVERGENCE (warn) fires with a one-notch grade downgrade. Also DMARCbis tag-aware: t=/np=/psd= parsed into analysis.tags, removed tags (pct/rf/ri) emit DEPRECATED_TAG, t=y emits TESTING_MODE with a one-notch downgrade. Returns the grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (enforced/partial/monitoring/monitoring_blind/invalid/not_configured), structured findings (NO_DMARC_RECORD, MULTIPLE_DMARC_RECORDS, INVALID_TAG, POLICY_NONE, POLICY_NONE_NO_RUA, PCT_BELOW_100, RUA_MISSING_UNDER_ENFORCEMENT, SP_NOT_ENFORCED, EXTERNAL_RUA_UNAUTHORIZED, DMARC_INHERITED_FROM_ORG, TESTING_MODE, DEPRECATED_TAG, DISCOVERY_DIVERGENCE), and an `analysis` block with the lookup ladder, discovery, source (self/org), org_domain, normalised tags, per-recipient RUA/RUF external-authorisation detail (RFC 7489 §7.1), and rua_unauthorised. Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "DMARC Record Analyser",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_tls_rpt — TLS-RPT Checker
Check the TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting, RFC 8460) record at _smtp._tls.<domain>. Strict §3 classification: the record must BEGIN with the case-sensitive v=TLSRPTv1 tag, more than one such record means receivers treat TLS-RPT as not implemented, and rua= is required. Validates every rua= destination syntactically (mailto:/https:// — reachability is never probed), and detects the MTA-STS and DANE prerequisites over DNS (TLSA at _25._tcp of the lowest-preference MX) with outage reported as unknown, never as absence. Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (valid/partial/invalid/not_configured), structured findings (TLS_RPT_NO_RECORD, TLS_RPT_INVALID_VERSION, TLS_RPT_MULTIPLE_RECORDS, TLS_RPT_NO_RUA, TLS_RPT_RUA_INVALID_URI, TLS_RPT_NO_VALID_RUA, TLS_RPT_NO_ENFORCEMENT_POLICY), and an `analysis` block with parsed tags, per-URI rua validation detail, and the prerequisite probe results. Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "TLS-RPT Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_mta_sts — MTA-STS Checker
Check MTA-STS (RFC 8461) for a domain: the _mta-sts TXT record (strict §3.1 selection — case-sensitive leading v=STSv1, exactly one record, required 1-32 alphanumeric id), the policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt fetched WITHOUT following redirects (§3.3), strict §3.2 policy validation (version/mode/max_age required, mx required unless mode none, max_age ≤ 31557600, duplicate keys first-wins), the policy-host X.509 certificate (§3.3 — an invalid cert means compliant senders fetch no policy), and live MX coverage against the mx: patterns (§4.1 — wildcards match exactly one leftmost label; coverage is all/partial/none, partial meaning strict senders skip the uncovered hosts per §5.1). Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (enforced/testing/reporting_only/invalid/not_configured), structured findings (MTA_STS_NO_TXT_RECORD, MTA_STS_RECORD_INVALID, MULTIPLE_MTA_STS_RECORDS, MTA_STS_POLICY_UNREACHABLE, MTA_STS_POLICY_REDIRECT, MTA_STS_POLICY_INVALID, MTA_STS_CERT_INVALID, MTA_STS_MODE_NONE, MTA_STS_MODE_TESTING, MTA_STS_MX_MISMATCH, MTA_STS_MX_PARTIAL_COVERAGE, MTA_STS_MAX_AGE_TOO_LOW), and an `analysis` block (record, policy incl. fetch_stage, cert, MX coverage detail, TLS-RPT/DANE cross-signals). Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "MTA-STS Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_bimi — BIMI Record Checker
Check default._bimi.<domain>: parses the BIMI record, validates the SVG Tiny-PS logo, inspects the VMC chain (expiry, EKU, SCT, issuer-accepted, SAN match, logotype hash), and verifies the DMARC prerequisite (p=quarantine/reject at pct=100 with no sp=none — the RFC 7489 reading Gmail and Apple Mail evaluate today). DMARCbis (RFC 9989) aware: t= is parsed into analysis.dmarc.t, t=y emits TESTING_MODE (warn under p=quarantine — bis receivers read it as none; info under p=reject), and a present pct= emits DEPRECATED_TAG (removed by RFC 9989 Appendix A.6, advisory only). Returns grade (A-F), structured findings, and an `analysis` block (logo/vmc/dmarc/provider_matrix). Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "BIMI Record Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_dane — DANE / TLSA Validator
Check SMTP DANE / TLSA records for a domain (RFC 7672). Resolves the MX hosts (falls back to the apex when none), looks up the TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx-host> over binary DoH, classifies each record (usage 0-3 / selector 0-1 / matching 0-2 per RFC 7671 §2.1), and confirms the answer carried the DNSSEC AD bit — DANE is meaningless without DNSSEC, so an unsigned TLSA answer is the dominant failure mode. Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (valid/valid_with_warnings/no_dnssec/not_configured/error), structured findings (DANE_NO_TLSA, DANE_TLSA_HOST_UNSIGNED, DANE_PKIX_TA_USED_WITHOUT_CHAIN, DANE_TLSA_EXACT_MATCH, DANE_PARTIAL_COVERAGE, DANE_TLSA_INVALID_USAGE/SELECTOR/MATCHING), and an `analysis` block (per-host TLSA records + DNSSEC status, the spec-compliance signals, and the MTA-STS cross-signal). DNS-only: it never opens a port-25 STARTTLS handshake, so it proves the TLSA records exist, are well-formed, and are DNSSEC-signed — never that they match the live cert (Hostinger and Cloudflare both block outbound 25). Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "DANE / TLSA Validator",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_dnssec — DNSSEC Checker
Validate a domain's DNSSEC chain of trust. Pulls DS (at the parent), DNSKEY, and RRSIG over binary DoH, walks the chain zone-by-zone (root → TLD → domain) recomputing each DS digest against the published DNSKEYs (RFC 4034 §5.1.4), and cross-checks the AD bit across Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, and OpenDNS so a single resolver's caching can't mask a break. Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (signed/signed_no_ds/partial/unsigned/broken), structured findings (DNSSEC_UNSIGNED, DNSSEC_DS_MISSING_AT_PARENT, DNSSEC_DS_ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED, DNSSEC_DNSKEY_ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED, DNSSEC_RRSIG_EXPIRED, DNSSEC_BOGUS, DNSSEC_AD_BIT_MISSING), and an `analysis` block (the full chain-walk, the per-resolver validator matrix, NSEC3 iteration/opt-out, CDS/CDNSKEY publication, signing mode, root-anchor state). Unsigned is the common case and returns status "info" (DNSSEC is optional), not a failure; signed_no_ds (DNSKEY published, no DS at the parent yet) is treated by validators as unsigned and also returns "info"; a published-but-non-validating zone returns "fail". Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "DNSSEC Checker",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}check_mx — MX Record Inspector
Inspect a domain's MX / mail-routing posture. Resolves the apex MX RRset (priority-sorted), and for each host the A/AAAA addresses, PTR + forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS), DANE TLSA at _25._tcp.<host>, IP-literal (RFC 5321 §5) and CNAME (RFC 2181 §10.3) violations, and the mail provider. Detects the null MX (RFC 7505), a null MX wrongly mixed with real MX, and the implicit MX via the apex A/AAAA when no MX exists (RFC 5321 §5). Probes the MTA-STS and TLS-RPT prerequisites over DNS (case-sensitive per RFC 8461/8460) with outage reported as unknown, never absence. Returns grade (A-F) with grade_reasons, a verdict (healthy/warnings/misconfigured/null_mx/no_mx/implicit_mx), structured findings (NO_MX_RECORD, MX_IMPLICIT_FALLBACK, NULL_MX, NULL_MX_WITH_OTHER, MX_POINTS_TO_IP, MX_POINTS_TO_CNAME, MX_HOSTNAME_UNRESOLVABLE, NO_PTR_RECORD, FCRDNS_MISMATCH, MX_IPV6_ONLY, MX_NO_TRANSPORT_SECURITY, MX_GATEWAY_RDNS_COSMETIC, MX_SINGLE_HOST, MX_DUPLICATE_HOST, MX_SHARED_PRIORITY, MX_MTA_STS_WITHOUT_TLS_RPT), and an `analysis` block (per-host enrichment incl. provider, ips with FCrDNS status, dane_tlsa, and the prerequisite probe results). DNSSEC AD is a UI-only signal, not gradeable through the DoH contract. Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"domain"
],
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^(?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-z]{2,}$",
"maxLength": 253,
"description": "Apex domain to inspect, e.g. \"google.com\". No scheme, no path."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "MX Record Inspector",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}analyze_email_headers — Email Header Analyser
Analyse a pasted block of raw email headers for spoofing and phishing tells. Input is the raw headers (everything up to the first blank line — "Show original" / "View source"); the message body is not required. Returns structured findings + a phishing verdict (likely_phishing/verify_sender/minor_concerns/legitimate/auth_incomplete) derived from SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment (RFC 7489 §3.1), Microsoft composite-auth compauth reason codes (000/010 enforced failure, 601 intra-org implicit failure, 001 weak posture), ARC chain integrity (RFC 8617 §5.2), homoglyph / IDN look-alike From domains (Unicode UTS #39), header smuggling via duplicate singleton headers (RFC 5322 §3.6), display-name-as-address spoofing, hidden bidi/control characters (UAX #9), Received-chain timestamps running backward (RFC 5321 §4.4), link display-text-vs-href mismatches, originating-IP FCrDNS (RFC 8601), and RFC 8058 List-Unsubscribe deliverability posture (category:compliance, never moves the verdict). Findings include DMARC_FAILED, SPF_HARD_FAIL, DKIM_SIGNATURE_FAILED, COMPAUTH_EXPLICIT_FAILURE, COMPAUTH_INTRA_ORG_IMPLICIT_FAILURE, HOMOGLYPH_DOMAIN, DUPLICATE_HEADER, DISPLAY_NAME_SPOOFED_ADDRESS, RECEIVED_TIMESTAMPS_BACKWARD, URL_DISPLAY_MISMATCH, HIDDEN_CONTROL_CHAR, BRAND_IMPERSONATION, and more (registered in docs/finding-codes.md). `status` is the finding-severity aggregate; `verdict` is the authoritative phishing judgment; `analysis` carries the verdict object + per-mechanism authentication. For privacy the echoed `input` is a digest only (from / subject / message_id) — raw headers are never returned. Read-only.
{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"headers"
],
"properties": {
"headers": {
"type": "string",
"maxLength": 262144,
"minLength": 1,
"description": "Raw email headers as a single string (everything up to the first blank line — the \"Show original\" / \"View source\" output). The message body is not required."
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}{
"type": "object",
"required": [
"tool",
"tool_version",
"schema_version",
"input",
"status",
"findings",
"records",
"timestamp",
"provenance"
],
"properties": {
"tool": {
"type": "string"
},
"error": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"message",
"retriable"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string"
},
"message": {
"type": "string"
},
"retriable": {
"type": "boolean"
}
}
},
"grade": {
"enum": [
"A",
"B",
"C",
"D",
"F"
],
"type": "string"
},
"input": {
"type": "object"
},
"status": {
"enum": [
"pass",
"warn",
"fail",
"info"
],
"type": "string"
},
"records": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"name",
"type",
"ttl",
"data"
],
"properties": {
"ttl": {
"type": "integer"
},
"data": {
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"verdict": {
"type": "string"
},
"analysis": {
"type": "object"
},
"findings": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"code",
"severity",
"title"
],
"properties": {
"code": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+$"
},
"title": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"enum": [
"info",
"warn",
"error"
],
"type": "string"
},
"explanation": {
"type": "string"
},
"remediation": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
},
"resolvers": {
"type": "array"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string"
},
"provenance": {
"type": "object",
"required": [
"operated_by"
],
"properties": {
"operated_by": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"tool_version": {
"type": "string"
},
"grade_reasons": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"schema_version": {
"type": "integer",
"const": 1
}
}
}{
"title": "Email Header Analyser",
"readOnlyHint": true,
"openWorldHint": true,
"idempotentHint": true,
"destructiveHint": false
}Prompts
1 advertised
audit_email_auth
Run the full email-authentication audit on a domain: SPF + DMARC + DKIM (common selectors) + BIMI. Returns a consolidated grade + remediation plan.
- domain
- Apex domain to audit. (required)
Resources
1 advertised
TamingDNS finding-code registry
Stable public-API code registry for every finding emitted by TamingDNS tools. See docs/finding-codes.md.
mcp://tamingdns/resources/finding-codes90-day uptime
A lightweight connection check about every six hours, sampled on hosts with many listings. It shows the server answered, not that its tools work.
- 2026-11-07: 1 of 1 checks answered
30-day availability
Aggregated from read-only remote checks; this is not a tool-execution or security guarantee.
- Successful checks
- 1 of 1 (100%)
- Average latency
- 559 ms
- 95th percentile latency
- 559 ms
Maintenance history
Public check and source-refresh events. Editorial and ownership records remain private.
- · probe · passed · 559 ms · metadata changed · 10 tool(s), 1 resource(s), 1 prompt(s); warnings: Advertises resources/templates/list but does not implement it
Connect from your client
Each snippet registers the same endpoint; pick the client you use.
Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http tamingdns-mcp https://tamingdns.com/mcpCodex
codex mcp add tamingdns-mcp --url https://tamingdns.com/mcpCursor
{
"mcpServers": {
"tamingdns-mcp": {
"url": "https://tamingdns.com/mcp"
}
}
}Cline
{
"mcpServers": {
"tamingdns-mcp": {
"type": "streamableHttp",
"url": "https://tamingdns.com/mcp",
"disabled": false
}
}
}VS Code
{
"servers": {
"tamingdns-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://tamingdns.com/mcp"
}
}
}Gemini CLI
gemini mcp add --transport http tamingdns-mcp https://tamingdns.com/mcpClaude Desktop
https://tamingdns.com/mcpWindsurf
{
"mcpServers": {
"tamingdns-mcp": {
"serverUrl": "https://tamingdns.com/mcp"
}
}
}Let your agent find its tools
Find servers like TamingDNS MCP from your agent. Add Koskamo once to search the index for endpoints, access requirements, and client setup. Public discovery needs no key.
Other developer tools servers
Do you run TamingDNS MCP?
Prove ownership with a DNS record, a well-known file, or your Official MCP Registry entry, and your edits publish immediately. Proofs are re-checked weekly; admins can still hide or remove a listing.